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Several days ago I shared with the Senate some

reflections on the Big Four Conference wnich is soon to open in
Geneva .

In substance I said that the President and the Secretary

of st te \orould be able to negotiate with str(;ngth and conviction
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Administration.
Shou d the Geneva Conference move the world closer to a desirable
pe ce, it rrill be largely because

Americans have made
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over the past decade will

for a ouccessful conference.
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The Austrian trl;8t'J is a co promise as are all bloodless

~cttlements .

For our part, the treaty ic satisfactory because in

the judgment of the President , the Secretary of Jt te and the

Senate it serves the peaceful purposes of the nati n
~

to the Austrian people .
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face the fact that the Russians believe it :;:-rves theirs
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they did not , it would not have been signed .

)!l th< t perspective,
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the Austri n treaty becomes one of a series of n&pja ai highly
significant moves l-Thich hav e character ized Soyiet policy in recent

Why. we may i·tell ask ourselves , have the Russians renounced

their treaties of reciprocal
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and the mited

Kingdom which ·,;ere directed against Ge~ militarism? Hhy have they
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in may judgment, is mere prelude .

The real drive is now only

beginning to unfold ~d i% pea b t:e.s t rs Cbhf:ng in h!IIXA" e
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will probe for weaknesses in every part of the structure

T4rtz o' t s (...

~x

peace ,.,hich together •·Ti th other nations we have bu.l t over the

past decade and on which rest s the future of vlestern civilization
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In 1949, I visited Germany and reported to the House Foreign Affairs

Co::nmi ttee that

Although

Ge~3ny

is at the present time in a very

weak position •ri th t ro sepur te governments .•. it is
potentially the str wngest nation in Western Europe •••
Germany is the big pri z e •••
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made a remarkable recovery from the Yar .
it already has the poYer to act as a

It is independent once aaain and

eparate factor , like France or the

United Kingdom, in the affairs of Europe .

It is nOY more than ever immune

to thP appeal of unification on Soviet terce .
But es Germany hes change J so has Russian policy .

That policy has gradually

be n shifting from German unification on Sovi t terns to Gercan unification

(IN~ ~ ~~ ~~
oo " at'l!lftn e

lilA .

Although this shift has long been in th

taken the shock of the sudden Russian reversal on th

making it has

ustrtan treaty and

- 7 the Soviet invitation to Chancellor Adenauer to visit Moscov to bring the
reality of it home to this country .
Until thes e tvo events occurred, our policyon Germany appears to
have been based on tvo assumptions.

The first vas that the Soviet Union

would never permit German unification except on Soviet terms and the German
people vould never accept it on Soviet terms.

The second was that Chancellor

Aienauer could keep Western Germany vith Western Europe no matter what else
happened.

Just a year ago, or even a few months ago, the air was filled with

an incredible optimisism about the German situation vhich stemmed from these
two assumptions .

Now, however, the assumptions seem to have been reduced to one; that

~

Chancellor Adeaauer will not let us dovn .
has been

~~~~
shaken ~ not~rely

A

dispelled .

The assumption that Chancellor
assumption .

The optimism on the German situation

~denauer

will not let us down is a safe

I have a deep admiration and respect for the understanding,

integrity and humanity which characterize
is a great statesman in the finest
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the German Prime ltinister.
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Adenauer has given unparalleled leaderspip to his people and to the
developnt:.nt of ~stern Europe~m unity .

He has done a gre2t deal and
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.....

The do.nger in our present cour-e, as I cee it, is that it

o-.\~

perpetuates the

~.Jt-~~

optimi~tic belie~ th~t Go~~,y

1\

~

i. with us no matter

"

what happens , 'that the Germans are now linked ine tric;<>bly with the

other nations of vTestern Europe.
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obscure the fact that the greatest daw.ge to the free nations J1as been
largely

self- inflicted~

It has resulted fr01., their o\m inner disunity,

and particulurJ:y the disunity of the

~/estern

European region.

Both gre..t wars of this century, in the first instance Here atteupted
suicides on tLe part of \·/estern

~urope .

The crit..:.cal danger of co1..munism

came after, not before, tbese massive assaults l-Thich the regiou launched UJ>on itself .

And only as a ua; is found to cope l-Tith tendcnci(;s of this kind

\Jill the free nations develop real security against communism and other
fcr.r1s of totalitarianism.

~~to..~
~

of modern
L'Urope .
jpns ba""

,.

mo t dangerous of theoe tendencies is
~ernany

l-11~

e.~sociated

\-lith the inability

to find a stable place in the cor.mon destiny of

explanations hc.ve been offered for tl.is phenomenon .

aOOt ibahed 1.t to> tire pelt=- "ttl" t!.e e.,, '!!ll£lf"

-Bri'tiSr1 antt to nume:rous

~/estern

~

!liS CUI - •
Ylftl the

-o~ e~·. (Regardless at \-That door or doors
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failure more than aP.y oti1er has gnawed at the vitals of our civilization
during the last
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That

force is strong and is spreading not only in G rmany but on the continent
of Europe as a vhole .
In remarks vhich I cade last D cember and appended to the record I
suggested the possibility thnt
'the Russians may risk the resurgence of German
militarism rather than face the inevitable
prospect of a uni f ied Gcnmany intcgrat d vith
Western Europe .
they are

~n

If thy choose th1

cour e ,

a position to 03ke important

economic, territorial and other conceasions to
th~

G rmans .

Moreover they could vithdrav their

occupation forces nnd expand the nucl ou of

- 13 German communist army .

Th~y

could, in other words,

offer Germany a unification with real nationalistic
inducements and ask in return only that the Germans
separate themselves from Western Europe .
There are now signs that they may be prepared

further .

It

is possible that the Russians will consider abandoning the puppet government in East Germany and relaxing their monolithic control over the
satellite countries of Eastern Europe.
from Berlin to Istanbul, a traditional
political interest .

A

These nations lie along the road
lin~

two-prong~
~

of German commercial and
this kind may create almost

irresistable pressures in Gemmany towards neutralism, pressures which may
be beyond even the capacity of Adenauer to control .
I do not know how far the Russians will go .

I believe , however, that

they will go to great lengths to dissolve the bonds which hold together the
free nations , from Greece and Turkey to Scandanavia and to reduce the influence
of the United States on the European continent and in surrounding areas .
far they go, provided
They will not succeed, regardless of how/the United States and other
Western nations do not sit on the sidelines as dispassionate spectators while
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and the play on the neutralist thee , they have touched the deepest emotion
that affects all

urope today, the fear of

w~r .

The need for the Western nations is to act, but to net not eimply
in reaction to whnt the Soviet Union d< ,
past suggest that they

ar~

follow instead of leading .

I

• Too many of our actions in th

hypnotic spell of Russian policy .

"

le become so fascinated

b~

of Soviet policy that we forgPt the potentialities of our o;.-n policy e.nd the
policies of the western European nations .
The need is to act , not in reaction to what thP Soviet Union doe , but
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In th.. co.se of G,..rman unification, 'l."e have paid lip-

but we hav
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think of it
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- 14a It seems to me that unificaion is also a unique German problem and the
t~e

is over-ripe for the Gercan people as a whole to examine this

que stion.

I hope therefore that the

~Test

German government will give

serious consideration to convening a conference of ••••,,...,_.ll'lll'•sra pol:tt;ical

- 16 inspired, although the communists undoubtedly profit by them.

They are

the fears of ordinary Europeans who twice in a generation have had to
live in the wreckage left by the marching boots.
German rearmament must proceed according to the formula of the
London-Paris accords.

There must be no retreat from that principle,

because a disarmed l·iestern Geroany, in the context of the present distribut ion of po·..,rer in Europe, is a greater danger to peace than an armed
Germany.

However, the size of the G rman army as stipulated in the London-

Paris accords need not be sacrosanct.

If at any t:l-ne, the Soviet Union is pre-

pared to deal realistically •with disarmament, then there is no reason why
the contemplated size of the German army cannot be adjusted

d~Nnwards

as

other nations including Russia and the satellites reduce their military
potential.

That approach

~ould

put to rest any genuine fears the Russians

may have of Germany and it will also relieve the uncertainty on the same
score in Hestern :::urope.
Finally, there is one great area in which the nations of the western
Yorld can animust act now instead of waiting placidly for Soviet policies

to drive wedges between them.

T hey can act to fulfill the deeper
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It means, above all, a -:rillingness

to face common problems together and to work ;.rith mtiom.l restraint
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The need for an approach of tnis kind is urgent

in fe:;tern Europe ; it is
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is desir ble •.-1ith all nations

may be on the
If we

matt~r

c~

thro:.1ghout the \ie.,tern «a:ld; it

tlu~ t If;

free to cooper te •·rherever they
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For that kind of an approach could

of free ru tions built not only

on a cilit ry base, but on t.e power of their creative accom lishments

and the power of their ideals to inspire the fnith of mankind .

Speech of Senatot Mike Mansheiti (D., Montana)
For Release a.. ~~i; ~
June)..'~, 1955
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GERMANY AND THE INITIATIVE FOR PEACE

Mr . President: Several days ago I shared with the Senate some
reflections on the Big Four Conference which h soon to open in Geneva.
in substance 1 said that the Fresident and the Secretary of State would be
able to negotiate with strength and conviction i£ they went into the Geneva
meetings with the united support of the nation,
There is no reason why they should not have that suppott.
participation in the Confer ence does not bear a par ty l abel.
logical development of policies going back many years .

Our

It is a

They began

with a Republican Congress and a Democratic Administration.

They are

bearing fruit with a Democratic Congress and a Republican Administration,
Should the Geneva Conference move the world closer to a desir able
peace, it will be largely because the sacrifices which all Americans have
made over the past decade will have helped to lay the groundwork for a
successful conference . It will be because for ten years this nation has
worked patiently and cooperatively with other nations to build the conditione
o! peace .
No small part of the success, I may add, will be due to the
distinguished chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Some

weeks ago, he had the wisdom and the initiative to suggest that the moment

- 2 might be ripe to explore the prospects for relievinc world tensions.

He

had the courage to speak some honest words on the realities of international life.

And in so doing he has rcnwakencd our faith in ourselves

and in our leadership .

He has reminded us of our enormous capacity,

when we arc united, to deal with the problems of peace no less than with
those of war,
In the Austrian Treaty we have had the first evidence that
conditions of peace may now be coming ir.to being, at least in Europe.
The Austrian settlement is a tangible indication that the shadow of
totalitarianism can be made to recede without bombs when the will to
freedom is unyielding and the strength to sustain it is adequate.

Under

the treaty an advanced position of Russian military power in vrcstern
Europe will be moved back towards the East in what may be a prelude to
further withdrawals.
The Austrian treaty is a compromise as are all bloodless settlements.

For our part, the treaty is satisfactory because in the judgment

of the President, the Secretary of State and the Senate it serves the
peaceful purposes of the nation and is acceptable to the Austrian people .

I! the Austrian treaty serves our ends, however, we must face the
fact that the Russians believe it serves theirs as well .
would not have been signed.

I! they did not, it

Viewed in that perspective, the Austrian

treaty becomes one of a series of highly significant moves which have
characterized Soviet policy in recent months .

Why, we may well ask

- 3 ourselves, have the Russians renounced their treaties of reciprocal
assistance with France and the United Kingdom which were directed
against Germnn militarism?

Why have they shown a more amenable

attitude on disarmament? Why did the leaders of the Soviet Union pay
homage to Marshall Tito in Belgrade? How are we to explain their
fabulous welcome for Prime Minister Nehru when just two or three
years ago he was being denounced as a tool of the western nations?
Most significant, why have they invited Chancellor Adenauer to establish
diplomatic relations and commercial agreements between the Soviet Union
and Western Germany?
I think it is now generally recognized that each of these actions
and others elsewhere are part of a tremendous Soviet diplomatic offensive
which began at least as far back as the death of Stalin in 1953. In August,
1954, in remarks in the Senate I referred to this drive in these terms:
There are great stakes involved in the diplomatic struggle •••
Here it is not a matter of a few resources, a few strategic
positions and a reluctant people being seized by the Communists and dragged into their camp. In this diplomatic
struggle, the willing allegiance or the benevolent neutrality
of entire nations is involved.
The communists are striving by a combination of diplomacy
and economic enticements to drive the free nations further
and further apart and to draw as many of them as possible
into their orbit or into an intermediate stage of neutralism.
What we have seen of the Soviet diplomatic offensive so far, in my
judgment, is mere prelude.

The real drive is now only beginning to unfold.

It will probe for weaknesses in every part of the structut·e of peace which

- 4 together with other nations we have built over the past decade and on
which rests the future of
country.

estern civiliz.ation and the security of this

The great test of the Soviet diplomatic drive is coming in

Germany.
For many years, it has been apparent that Germany would recover
and would become once again the decisive power in Europe, the pivot on
which the questions o£ war or peace and freedom or totalitarianism would
turn.

In 1949, I visited Germany and reported to the House Foreign

A!fairs Committee that
Although Ger many is at the present time in a very weak
position with two separate governments ••• it is potentially
the strongest nation in Western Europe •.• Germany is the
big prize,,.
Even in those days the Soviet Union was attempting to draw the whole
o£ Germany away from Western Europe .

1he Soviet Union had already

recognized that unification was the one great temptation it could o££er to
the German people.

The Russian c££orts then were based on German uni-

£\cation on Soviet terms.

Their demands were !or a united Germany that

would !it into the Communist bloc o£ Eastern Europe.

The people of West

Germany were immunized against Soviet demands of that kind to subvert
the m .

They were exhausted by the war.

They had seen the excesses of

the Soviet occupation in the eastern zone which had driven millions of
refugees into the west.

And they were protected by the Allied armies of

occupation as evidenced by the success of the Bertin airlift.
demands for German unification on Soviet terms got nowhe re.

The Russian

- 5 The situation now has changed.

Western Germany has made a

remarkable recovery from the war. It is independent once again and it
already has the power to act as a separate factor, like France or the
United Kingdom, in the aftairs of Europe. It is now more than ever
immune to the appeal of unification on Soviet terms.
But as Germany has changed, so has Russian policy.

That policy

has gradually been shifting from German unification on Soviet terms to
German unification on terms more acceptable to the Germans .

Although

this shift has long been in the making it has taken the shock of the sudden
Russian reversal on the Austrian treaty and the Soviet invitation to
Chancellor Adenauer to visit Moscow to bring the reality of it home to
this country.
Until these two events occurred, our policy on Germany appears
to have been based on two assumptions.

The first was that the Soviet Union

would never permit German unification except on Soviet terms and the
German people would never accept it on Soviet terms.

The second was

that Chancellor Adenauer could keep Western Germany with Western Europe
no matter what else happened.

Just a year ago, or even a few months ago,

the air was filled with an incredible optimism about the German situation
which stemmed from these two assumptions.
Now, however, the assumptions seem to have been reduced to one:
that Chancellor Adenauer will not let us down.

The unwarranted optimism

on the German situation has been shaken even if it has not been entirely
dispelled.

- 6 The assumption that Chancellor Adenauer will not let ue down is
a safe assumption.

I have a deep admiration and respect for the under-

atanding, integrity and humanity which characterize the Gcrm:ln Prime
Minister.
Europe.

He is a crcat statesman in the finest traditions of \f'cstcrn
He knows, perhaps as few other men do, how vital it is that

Germany remain linked with the western nations .
Chancellor Adenauer will not let us down .

The full faith which

President Eisenhower expressed in him a few weeks ago was not misplaced.

I know that I speak the thoughts of many other members of the

Senate who are acquainted with Adenauer when I say that I share the
President' s faith.
Because I do, however, I am disturbed by an American policy
respecting Germany which is allowed to rest in so many essentials on
his shoulders alone. It is not only unfair to Adenauer, it is a dangerous
way of dealing with the tremendous forces that arc at work in Germany
and Europe today.

Those forces have historical roots that go back

decades and centuries.

They will be in operation long after the Chancellor

and every member of this Chamber have gone.
If our policies on Germany are to be effective, they must not be

built solely around one man, however great he may be, but largely on
the basis of the historical and other forces that arc at work in the situation.
Chancellor Adenauer has given unparalleled leadership to his people and to
the development of Western European unity.

He has done ;\ great deal ann

l
- 7 he can do more, but he cannot be expected, nor should he be asked to
perform m iracles.
T he dang er in our present course, as I see it, is that it perpetuates
the optimistic and unsound belief that Germany, or at least Western Germany,
is with us no matter what happens, that the Germans are now linked
inextricably with the other nations of Western Europe. It is true that we
have moved a long way in that direction in the past decade .

Economic

bonds have been developed under the European Coal and Steel Community,
the European Payments Union and other cooperati ve arrangements.

The

London-Paris accords have provided a framewo r k for military integration
and the dim outlines of political collaboration in Western Europe .
These measures , however important they may be, constitute a
promise that Germany will remain with the weste r n nations.

They are not

a guarantee.
Twice in this century, our civilization has skir ted the edge of
doom because the western nations assumed that the western world would
hold together largely of its own accord .

Twice our heritage has been

tossed recklessly into the fires of war because of unwarranted optimism
and sheer political inertia on that score .

Both conflicts which began

within Western Europe spread great damage in that r egion but both
reached out to engulf this nation in their tragedy .
Communism fed on these conflagrations.

After the wars had

burned themselves out, the Communists tore down nations and ideals

- 8 which had been severely weakened by the conflicts.

That is the destructive

role which communism occupies in the contemporary world and we must
not lose sight of it.

By the same token, however, it is essential not to

permit this destructiveness to obscure the fact that the greatest damage
to the free nations has been largely se\i-inflicted.

It has resulted from

their own inner disunity, and particularly the disunity of the Western
European region.
Both great wars of this century, in the first instance were attempted
suicides on the part of Western Europe.

The critical danger of communism

came after, not before, these massive assaults which the region launched
upon itscli.

And only as a way is found to cope with tendencies of this

kind will the free nations develop real security against communism and
other forms of totalitarianism.
Let us face the fact that the most dangerous of these tendencies is
associated with the inability of modern Germany to find a stable place in
the common destiny of Western Europe.
offered for this phenomenon.

Many explanations have been

Regardless at what door or doors responsi-

bility is laid, however, there can be little doubt that this failure more
than any other has gnawed at the vitals of our civilization during the last
hal! century.
The failure need not be repeated a third time.
say now that it will not be repeated?

But can we

Can we say with assurance that the

Soviet drive to destroy the developing integration of Germany anc Western
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Europe and thereby establish the conditions for a third war in the west will
not succeed?
The Russians are not without extensive resources to make a powerful
attempt in that direction .

They can combine an offer of German unification

on German nationalist terms with numerous concessions to the force of
neutralism.

That force is strong and is spreading not only in Germany but

on the continent of Eur ope as a whole.
In remarks which I made last December and appended to the record
I suggested the possibility that
the Russians may risk the resurgence of German militarism
rather than face the inevitable prospect of a unified Germany
integrated with Western Europe. If they choose this course,
they are in a position to make important economic, territorial
and other concessions to the Germans. Moreover they could
withdraw their occupation forces and expand the nucleous of
German militarism which already exists in the East German
communist army. They could, in other words, offer Germany
a unification with r eal nationalistic inducements and ask in
return only that the Germans separate themselves from
Western Europe.
There are now signs that they may be prepared to go even further.
It is possible that the Russians will consider abandoning the puppet

government in East Germany and relaxing their monolithic control over
the satellite countries of Eastern Europe.

These nations lie along the

road from Berlin to Istanbul, a traditional line of German commercial
and political interest. A two-pronged diplomatic drive of this kind may
create almost irresistable pressures in Germany towards neutralism,
pressures which may be beyond even the capacity of Adenauer to control.

- 10 I do not know how far the Russians will go.

1 believe, however,

that they will go to great lengths to dissolve the bonds which hold together
the free nations, !rom Greece and Turkey to Scandinavia ond to reduce the
influence of the United States on the European continent ond in sur:-ounding
areas.
They will not succeed, regardless of how far they go, provided the
United States and other ,. estern nations do not sit on U1e sidelines as
dispassionate spectators while the Russians go about these destructive
tasks .

As it is now, they hold the diplomatic o££cnsive on the two most

important fronts in Europe .

By their invitation to Chancellor Adenauer,

they have gained a real advantage on the question of German unification.
By their sudden shifts on disarmaments and the Austrian treaty, their
long-time championing of a Big Four meeting and the play on the neutralist
theme, they have touched the deepest emotion that affects all Europe today,
the fear of war .
The need for the Western nations is to act, but to act not simply
in reaction to what the Soviet Union does; too many of our actions in the
past suggest that they are performed under the hypnotic spell of Russian
policy .

We follow instead of leading.

We become so fascinated by the

enigmatic twists of Soviet policy that we forget the potentialities of our
own policy and the policies of the western European nations.
The need is to act, not in reaction to what the Soviet Union does,
but to act because it is right and desirable to do so.

- 11 In the case of German unification, we have paid lip-service to the
idea but we have been disposed to think of it primarily as a Big Four
problem. It seems to me that unification is also a unique German problem
and the time is over-ripe for the German people as a whole to examine
this question.

I hope therefore that the West German government will

give serious consideration to convening a conference of political, labor
religious and commercial leaders from all Germany, both East and West
to consider the problems of unification. After all, it is the Germans
themselves who must live together in peace in a unified country and it is
they who must be satisfied with the political conditions which will make
that possible.
With respect to the appeal of peace in Europe, I think that the
President by curbing warlike talk in his own Administration and by his
public statements in the field of atomic energy has made an important
contribution in clarifying to the world the pacific intentions of this country.
There is one matter , however, which requires special consideration insofar
as it applies to Europe.

That is the problem of German rearmament. In

the London - Paris accords, 'Hestern Europe has accepted the necessity for
German rearmament.

We would be closing our eyes to reality, however,

if we believe that it has been accepted other than with fear and uncertainty

in every country in that region, including Western Germany.

The fear

and uncertainty are not communist-inspired, although the communists
undoubtedly profit by them .

They are the fears of ordinary Europeans who
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twice in a generation have had to live in the wreckage left by the m arching
boots.
German r earmam en t must proceed according to tho formula of the
London- P aris a ccordo .

There must be no retreat !rom that principle,

because a disarmed Y'es tern Germany, in the

conte~t

of the present

distribution of power in Europe, is a greater danger to peace than an
armed Germany.

However, the size o! the German army as stipulated in

the London -Faria accords need not be sacrosanct.

I£ at any time , the

Soviet Union is prepared to deal realistically with disarmament, then
there is no reason why the contemplated size of the German army cannot
be adjusted downwards as other nations including Russia and the satellites
reduce their military potential.

That approach would put to rest any

genuine fears the Russians may have of Germany and it will also r elieve
the uncertainty on the same score in Western Europe.
Finally, there is one great area in which the nations of the western
world can and mus t act now instead of waiting placidly for Soviet policies
to drive wedges between them,
of the London-Paris accords.

They can act to fulfill the deeper promise
The real meaning of those agreements is

not simply the addition of 12 German divisions to the defenses of the free
nations, however important that might be.

The real meaning lies in their

promise of greater unity among the free nations.
That promise means more than integrated military defense.

It

means a drawing together of the Western European nation• in the economic
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field, in the political field, in all matters in which governments can better
serve their citizens by working together rather than separately. It means ,
above all, a willin gness to face co mmon problems together and to work
with national restraint in their solution .

The need for an appl:"o2.ch of this

kind is urgent in Vlestcrn Europe; it is necessary throughout the wester n
world; it is desirable with all nations free to cooperate wherever they may
be on the globe.

If we can maintain and perfect that kind o£ an approach, it will
matter far less to us and to others what the Soviet leacl.ers may think or
do in any given situation. For that kind of an approach could bring a
vast gr o wth in the strength of free nations built not only on a military base,
but on the power of their creative accomplishments and the power of their
ideals to inspire the faith of ::nankind.

